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he severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars) is responsible for
 
the first pandemic of the 21st century. Within months after its emergence in
Guangdong Province in mainland China, it had affected more than 8000 pa-
tients and caused 774 deaths in 26 countries on five continents. It illustrated dramati-
cally the potential of air travel and globalization for the dissemination of an emerging
infectious disease and highlighted the need for a coordinated global response to con-
tain such disease threats. We review the cause, epidemiology, and clinical features of the
disease.
An unusual atypical pneumonia emerged in Foshan, Guangdong Province, mainland
China, in November 2002.
 
1,2
 
 In February and March 2003, the disease spread to Hong
Kong and then to Vietnam, Singapore, Canada, and elsewhere (Table 1).
 
3,4
 
 The new dis-
ease was named the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and a preliminary case
definition was established.
 
4
 
 A novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was identified as the caus-
ative agent.
 
5-10
 
 Coronaviruses are a family of enveloped, single-stranded–RNA viruses
causing disease in humans and animals, but the other known coronaviruses that affect
humans cause only the common cold.
The presence of SARS-CoV has been demonstrated by reverse-trancriptase poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and the isolation of the virus from respiratory secre-
tions, feces, urine, and tissue specimens from lung biopsy,
 
11,12
 
 indicating that the
infection is not confined to the respiratory tract. The experimental infection of cyno-
molgus macaques with SARS-CoV produced a pneumonia that was pathologically sim-
ilar to SARS in humans.
 
8,9
 
 Other pathogens, including human metapneumovirus
 
13,14
 
and chlamydia,
 
7,15
 
 have been detected together with SARS-CoV in some patients with
SARS, but they have not been found consistently.
 
5,9
 
 The experimental infection of
macaques with human metapneumovirus did not lead to a SARS-like disease, and coin-
fection of macaques with human metapneumovirus and SARS-CoV did not enhance the
pathogenicity of the SARS-CoV in this animal model.
 
8
 
 Thus, all the information that is
available to date suggests that SARS-CoV is necessary and sufficient for the causation
of SARS in humans, but it remains to be determined whether microbial or other cofac-
tors enhance the severity or transmissibility of the disease. The complete genetic se-
quence of the SARS-CoV genome was determined, and it provided confirmation that
SARS-CoV belongs to a new group within the coronavirus family (Table 1).
 
16,17
 
Since seroepidemiologic data
 
5,6,12,18
 
 suggested that SARS-CoV had not previously
been endemic in humans, it seemed likely that this was a virus of animals that had
crossed the species barrier to humans in the recent past. This hypothesis was further
supported by anecdotal reports that some patients who had SARS in Guangdong Prov-
ince in November and December 2002 reported a history of occupational exposure to
live, caged animals that are used as exotic “game food,” a culinary delicacy in southern
t
cause
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China.
 
19
 
 SARS-like coronaviruses were isolated
from Himalayan palm civets (
 
Paguma larvata
 
) and
from a raccoon dog (
 
Nyctereutes procynonoides
 
) in
one market in Guangdong Province where wild
game animals are sold. In addition, persons in-
volved in the wild-animal trade in Guangdong Prov-
ince had a higher seroprevalence of SARS-CoV than
workers in other parts of the market or unrelated
controls.
 
20
 
 These findings support the hypothesis
that SARS-CoV originated from animals and point
to markets that trade in live game animals as poten-
tial sites of interspecies transmission. Experiments
have shown that the virus can also infect other
small mammals such as ferrets and cats, causing
disease in the former
 
21
 
 — findings that may have
epidemiologic relevance. Studies in trapped wild
animals and domestic animals and the genetic
analysis of viruses isolated from them will help to
define the animal reservoir of the virus in nature.
To date, there have been a few preliminary attempts
at modeling that will permit the quantitative assess-
ment of the epidemic potential of SARS and the ef-
fectiveness of control measures. The results indi-
cate that the SARS-CoV is less transmissible than
was initially thought, with the average number of
secondary cases resulting from each case estimat-
ed to be two to four overall. However, one feature
of this disease is that a few infected persons have
been responsible for a disproportionate number of
transmissions — the so-called super-spreading
events.
 
18,22-27
 
 These results suggest that SARS-CoV
is sufficiently transmissible to cause a very large ep-
idemic if it is left unchecked but that it is not so con-
tagious overall as to be uncontrollable with good,
basic public health measures.
 
23,24,26
 
Most studies of SARS cases in which transmis-
sion occurred from a single point of exposure esti-
mated the incubation period to be between 2 and 10
days, with a median ranging from 4 to 7 days.
 
26-28
 
However, with the application of maximum-likeli-
hood methods, the mean incubation period was cal-
culated to be 6 days, and the maximal incubation
period 14 days.
 
22
 
 Recent studies in China indicate
that some cases may have developed after incuba-
tion periods of up to 20 days, although data on the
history of exposure were incomplete.
 
29
 
 However,
public health measures based on the maximal in-
cubation period of 10 days, which the World Health
Organization (WHO) estimated on the basis of stud-
ies, were successful in interrupting the chain of in-
fection globally. It is not clear whether the route of
infection influences the incubation period.
 
26
 
Although some asymptomatic and mild in-
fections have been documented, they seem to be
epidemiology
 
* WHO denotes World Health Organization.
 
Table 1. A Chronology of Events.*
Date Key Events
 
November 2002 Unusual atypical pneumonia documented in Foshan, 
Guangdong Province, China. 
January 2003 Outbreaks of pneumonia in Guangzhou (capital city of 
Guangdong Province).
February 11, 2003 WHO receives reports of an outbreak of respiratory dis-
ease in Guangdong Province: 305 cases and 5 deaths. 
February 20, 2003 Fatal influenza A (H5N1 subtype) identified in family re-
turning to Hong Kong from Fujian Province, China.
February 21, 2003 65-Year-old doctor from Guangdong Province checks in 
at “Hotel M” in Hong Kong (index patient); he has 
been ill since February 15. His health deteriorates fur-
ther; he is admitted to the hospital on February 22. 
He infects at least 17 other guests and visitors at the 
hotel, some of whom travel to Vietnam, Singapore, 
and Toronto, where they initiate transmission of local 
clusters of cases. 
February 26, 2003 A Hotel M contact is admitted to a private hospital in Ha-
noi and is the source of an outbreak there; 7 health 
care workers become ill by March 5. 
March 4, 2003 A Hotel M contact is admitted to Prince of Wales Hospi-
tal in Hong Kong. By March 7, health care workers at 
this hospital report a respiratory illness. 
March 5, 2003 A Hotel M contact dies in Toronto; 5 family members are 
affected. 
March 12, 2003 WHO issues a global alert.
March 14, 2003 Singapore and Toronto report clusters of atypical pneu-
monia. In retrospect, both groups have an epidemio-
logic link to Hotel M. During travel, symptoms de-
velop in one of the doctors who treated patients in 
Singapore; he is quarantined in transit on arrival in 
Germany. 
March 15, 2003 WHO has received reports of more than 150 cases of the 
new disease, now named the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS). A travel advisory is issued.
March 17, 2003 WHO multicenter laboratory network established for the 
study of SARS causation and diagnosis.
March 21–27, 2003 A novel coronavirus is identified in patients with SARS.
April 12, 2003 Mapping of the full genome of SARS-associated corona-
virus (soon called SARS-CoV) is completed.
April 16, 2003 WHO announces that SARS-CoV is the causative agent 
of SARS. 
June 2003 A virus related to SARS-CoV is isolated from animals.
July 5, 2003 The absence of further transmission in Taiwan signals 
the end of the SARS outbreak in humans. 
September 2003 Laboratory-acquired SARS-CoV infection reported in 
Singapore. 
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uncommon
 
26,30,31
 
 and do not appear to contribute
to the extension of the chain of infection among
humans. For example, a recent mild infection with
SARS-CoV acquired in the laboratory was not trans-
mitted to any contacts of the affected person.
 
32
 
 De-
spite numerous attempts, there has been no docu-
mented isolation of the virus from persons with
asymptomatic infections, and in recent serologic
and epidemiologic studies, transmission from per-
sons with asymptomatic cases to contacts could
not be detected.
 
18,31
 
 SARS-CoV RNA was detected
in four asymptomatic, quarantined persons in Hong
Kong, with seroconversion in one, but no virus
could be isolated.
 
18
 
SARS has been transmitted primarily, but not
exclusively, in health care and hospital settings,
generally five or more days after the onset of dis-
ease and from patients who were severely ill.
 
22,24,26
 
These observations correlate with the finding that
the peak viral load is reached around the 10th day
of illness.
 
11,12
 
 There has been no reported instance
of transmission before the onset of symptoms of
disease. Transmission to casual and social contacts
is uncommon, but transmission has occurred occa-
sionally after close contact with a patient with SARS
in the workplace, on an airplane, or in a taxi.
 
26
 
 Al-
though virus can be detected by RT-PCR for more
than 30 days after the onset of illness, it is difficult
to isolate the virus after the third week of disease.
 
12
 
This difficulty is consistent with the epidemiologic
observation that no transmission has been docu-
mented more than 10 days after the resolution of
fever.
 
26
 
The primary mode of transmission appears to
be through direct or indirect contact of mucous
membrane (eyes, nose, or mouth) with infectious
respiratory droplets or fomites.
 
3,26,27
 
 The use of
aerosol-generating procedures (such as endotra-
cheal intubation, bronchoscopy, and treatment with
aerosolized medication) in hospitals may amplify
the transmission of SARS-CoV, and outbreaks have
involved more than 100 patients on occasion.
 
3,26-28
 
SARS-CoV survives for many days when dried on
surfaces and in feces at an alkaline pH.
 
33
 
 Although
data from direct comparisons are not yet available,
a review of previously published data suggests that
SARS-CoV may be far more stable than other hu-
man respiratory viruses, such as respiratory syncy-
tial virus. The role of fecal–oral transmission is un-
known but may be important, given that profuse
watery diarrhea is a common feature of the disease
and that SARS-CoV is shed in large quantities in
stool.
 
11
 
 There have been no reports of foodborne
or waterborne transmission; however, studies are
needed to determine whether these routes have
any role.
 
26
 
In some instances, other modes of transmission
have clearly been relevant. For example, given the
point-source nature and the temporal and spatial
progression of the community outbreak that af-
fected more than 300 persons in the Amoy Gardens
apartment complex in Hong Kong, it is unlikely to
have been caused solely by transmission through
respiratory droplets or contact. The leading hypoth-
esis is that small virus-containing droplets from
contaminated sewage entered the bathrooms of the
apartment complex through dried-up 
 
U
 
-traps,
 
34
 
 but
other contributory factors cannot be ruled out.
 
35,36
 
To date, there have been two reported cases of
transmission from children to adults and no reports
of transmission from children to other children.
 
26,37
 
There have been no reports of vertical or perinatal
transmission.
 
38
 
A combination of tracing of contacts and mo-
lecular epidemiologic data provides a better under-
standing of the genesis of the SARS pandemic. For
instance, contact tracing suggested that a 65-year-
old physician from Guangdong Province who stayed
for one day at a hotel (“Hotel M”) in Hong Kong on
March 21, 2003, transmitted the virus to a number
of guests who, on their return or further travel to
Vietnam, Singapore, and Toronto, initiated local
transmission and contributed to the global dissem-
ination of the disease.
 
27,39,40
 
Molecular epidemiologic studies indicate that
viruses from the outbreaks in Hong Kong, Vietnam,
Singapore, Toronto, and Taiwan are clonally related,
whereas those from Guangdong Province are ge-
netically more diverse.
 
41-43
 
 Although there is evi-
dence that other SARS-CoVs were introduced into
Hong Kong in February 2003, all of them belonging
to genetic lineages distinct from that of the index
case in Hong Kong, none of these viruses appear to
have generated a substantial number of secondary
cases or contributed to the subsequent outbreak in
Hong Kong.
 
43
 
 This observation raises the question
of whether some viral lineages are more prone to
transmission than others. Further molecular epi-
demiologic data from mainland China may help
to address this question. However, viral factors by
themselves are an inadequate explanation for su-
per-spreading events, since most patients infected
in a super-spreading incident are not super-spread-
ers themselves. Other biologic and behavioral fac-
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tors in the host, as well as environmental factors,
may contribute to such incidents. Undetected cases
in hospitals and the use of aerosol-generating pro-
cedures may explain some, but not all, super-spread-
ing events.
 
26,44
 
The role of seasonality in the transmission of
SARS-CoV is currently unknown. Many respiratory
viruses, including the human coronaviruses (e.g.,
229E), are most common in the winter. However,
this is not true of all respiratory viruses and all geo-
graphic regions. For example, the transmission of
respiratory syncytial virus (and sometimes influen-
za) in Hong Kong is maximal during the summer,
and the SARS outbreak in China peaked at the end
of April, about two to three months after the usual
peak of influenza activity in the northern Chinese
provinces.
SARS has affected persons in all age groups; there
has been a slight predominance of female patients,
which is probably related to the increased likeli-
hood of exposure among nurses.
 
22
 
 SARS has also
been reported in immunocompromised patients
and pregnant women, but the numbers of reported
cases are too small to permit any judgment as to
whether the outcome was more or less severe in
such patients.
 
38,45,46
 
Infected persons present initially with fever,
myalgia, malaise, and chills or rigor (Table
2).
 
1,3,5,11,14,40,47-51
 
 Cough is common, but short-
ness of breath, tachypnea, or pleurisy is prominent
only later in the course of the illness. Unlike other
atypical pneumonias caused by mycoplasma or chla-
mydia, SARS is less commonly manifested as up-
per respiratory symptoms such as rhinorrhea and
sore throat. A watery diarrhea occurs in some pa-
tients later in the course of the illness (Table 2). Res-
piratory signs such as rales are present in less than
one third of cases, and their severity often seems
lower than would be expected on the basis of the
findings on radiography of the chest.
 
5
 
 Afebrile cas-
es of SARS can occur in the elderly, who may
present with malaise and decreased appetite. In such
patients, the presenting problem may even be a fall
and fracture.
 
52
 
Lymphocytopenia is common, and in some pa-
tients the platelet count is depressed, with con-
comitant increases in the level of 
 
d
 
-dimers and
the activated partial-thromboplastin time (Table
3).
 
1,3,5,11,14,40,47,49
 
 The levels of alanine amino-
transferase, creatine kinase, and lactate dehydro-
genase may be increased. However, these labora-
tory findings do not allow reliable discrimination
between SARS and other causes of community-
acquired pneumonia.
 
53
 
 Depending on the interval
between the onset of fever and hospital admission,
the initial chest radiograph is abnormal in 60 to 100
percent of cases (Table 4).
 
54-63
 
 A high-resolution
computed tomographic (CT) scan is abnormal in
67 percent of patients with initially normal chest
radiographs.
 
62
 
 The most common initial radio-
graphic abnormalities are ground-glass opacifi-
cations that do not obscure the view of underlying
vessels or focal consolidations of the peripheral,
subpleural, and lower zones of the lungs (Table 4).
Mediastinal lymphadenopathy, cavitation, and pleu-
ral effusions are rare.
One third of patients with SARS have improve-
ment, with defervescence and resolution of radi-
ographic changes.
 
46
 
 The other two thirds have
persistent fever, increasing shortness of breath,
tachypnea, oxygen desaturation, worsening of chest
signs on physical examination, and the onset of di-
arrhea.
 
11
 
 Serial chest radiographs or CT scans re-
veal the progression of the original abnormality into
unilateral or bilateral multifocal air-space consoli-
dations.
 
46,59,60
 
 Shifting or fluctuating radiograph-
ic shadows have been noted. Pneumomediastinum
without preceding positive-pressure ventilation or
intubation is a characteristic radiographic sign of
SARS.
 
11
 
 The subpleural pneumonic process may
cause a pleurodesis-like effect, and the diffuse alve-
olar damage has led to fibrosis and the formation
of cysts. The air leak resulting from the rupture of
these cysts can only dissect along the bronchovas-
cular bundle, thereby causing pneumomediasti-
num, an unusual complication.
About 20 to 30 percent of patients require ad-
mission to an intensive care unit, and most of them
require mechanical ventilation.
 
3,5,11,14,40,47-49
 
A low-tidal-volume strategy for the protection of
the lungs has usually been used for ventilation, with
volume-control or pressure-control ventilation tar-
geting tidal volumes of 6 ml per kilogram of pre-
dicted body weight and plateau pressures of less
than 30 cm of water.
 
64
 
 Positive end-expiratory pres-
sure, the fraction of inspired oxygen, and the venti-
lator rates have then been adjusted to maintain a
partial pressure of arterial oxygen of more than 55
mm Hg (oxygen saturation as measured by pulse
oximetry, >88 to 90 percent), with or without per-
missive hypercapnia. The terminal event has been
the clinical disease
Copyright © 2003 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
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severe respiratory failure, multiple organ failure,
sepsis, or intercurrent medical illness such as
acute myocardial infarction.
Residual ground-glass opacifications have been
noted on follow-up chest radiographs and CT scans
obtained about one month after admission in 80
percent and 95 percent of patients, respectively,
who recovered from SARS. CT scans have shown
signs of fibrosis (including traction bronchiecta-
sis and parenchymal bands) and peribronchovas-
cular interstitial thickening.
 
58
 
 Between 6 and 20
percent of discharged patients have had some de-
gree of respiratory impairment that might be relat-
ed to residual lung fibrosis, muscle weakness, and
systemic effects of the viral illness.
 
65
 
 Post-trau-
matic stress disorder and depression are common
among patients with SARS and persist beyond the
period of hospitalization.
 
66
 
 Further follow-up is
required for the detection of other long-term com-
plications of corticosteroid treatment, such as
avascular necrosis of bone.
Pathological analysis of the lung at autopsy in
patients who died within 10 days after the onset of
illness revealed diffuse alveolar damage, desqua-
mation of pneumocytes, an inflammatory infiltrate,
edema, and hyaline-membrane formation. In pa-
tients who died later in the course of illness, organ-
izing diffuse alveolar damage was seen, with squa-
mous metaplasia and multinucleate giant cells of
either macrophage or epithelial-cell origin.
 
3,6,67,68
 
Viral RNA was detectable by RT-PCR at high viral
loads in the lung, bowel, and lymph nodes but was
also detectable in the spleen, liver, and kidney.
 
69
 
 In
lung specimens, alveolar epithelial cells and, to a
lesser extent, macrophages and bronchial epithe-
lial cells showed evidence of viral antigen on im-
 
* SARS denotes severe acute respiratory syndrome, NA not applicable, and NM not mentioned (in the relevant reports).
 
Table 2. Initial Clinical Presentation of Adults with SARS.*
Variable China Hong Kong Canada Singapore All Four Countries
Demographics
 
No. of cases reported 190 388 154 20 752
Age of patients — yr Range, 16–84 Mean, 42.9 Median, 45 Median, 28 NA
Sex
Male — no.
Female — no.
Ratio of male to female
70
120
0.58:1
174
214
0.8:1
94
60
1.57:1
5
15
0.33:1
343
409
0.84:1
 
Clinical features — no./total no. (%)
 
Fever 190/190 (100.0) 388/388 (100.0) 153/154 (99.4) 20/20 (100.0) 751/752 (99.9)
Chill or rigors 89/190 (46.8) 245/378 (64.8) 40/144 (27.8) 3/20 (15.0) 377/732 (51.5)
Myalgia 114/190 (60.0) 169/388 (43.6) 73/154 (47.4) 9/20 (45.0) 365/752 (48.5)
Malaise 179/190 (94.2) 72/175 (41.1) 57/154 (37.0) 9/20 (45.0) 317/539 (58.8)
Rhinorrhoea NM 44/198 (22.2) 3/144 (2.1) 3/20 (15.0) 50/362 (13.8)
Sore throat NM 65/378 (17.2) 21/154 (13.6) 5/20 (25.0) 91/552 (16.5)
Cough 175/190 (92.1) 162/338 (47.9) 108/154 (70.1) 15/20 (75.0) 460/702 (65.5)
Dyspnea 175/190 (92.1) 31/250 (12.4) 68/154 (44.2) 8/20 (40.0) 282/614 (45.9)
Chest pain or pleurisy 41/190 (21.6) 3/10  (30.0) 3/10  (30.0) NM 47/210 (22.4)
Anorexia NM 37/188 (19.7) NM NM 37/188 (19.7)
Nausea or vomiting NM NM 1/10  (10.0) 7/20 (35.0) 8/30  (26.7)
Diarrhea 46/190 (24.2) 45/303 (14.9) 39/154 (25.3) NM 130/647 (20.1)
Headache 116/190 (61.1) 118/388 (30.4) 54/154 (35.1) 4/20 (20.0) 292/752 (38.8)
Dizziness 89/190 (46.8) 68/263 (25.9) 6/144 (4.2) NM 163/597 (27.3)
 
Physical signs — no./total no. (%)
 
Tachycardia NM NM 71/154 (46.1) NM 71/154 (46.1)
Tachypnea NM NM 60/154 (39.0) NM 60/154 (39.0)
Chest rales NM 19/50  (38.0) 37/154 (24.0) NM 56/204 (27.5)
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munohistochemical analysis (Nicholls J: personal
communication) and on in situ hybridization.
 
70
 
SARS is a viral pneumonia that progresses rapidly.
The initial manifestations of SARS are not specific,
and it cannot be clinically differentiated from other
acute community-acquired pneumonias. The oc-
currence of lower respiratory disease, particularly
pneumonia, in epidemiologically linked clusters
of patients raises the level of suspicion but is not
unique to SARS. Diseases such as influenza can
cause similar outbreaks. The case definition of SARS
has been refined over time.
 
71,72
 
 During a hospital
outbreak in Hong Kong, an emergency-room study
showed that the initial case definition of suspected
SARS that was published by the WHO had a sensi-
tivity of 26 percent and a specificity of 96 percent.
 
51
 
Additional cases were uncovered through daily clin-
ical and radiographic follow-up evaluation of epi-
demiologically linked patients who did not meet a
sufficient number of criteria to satisfy the case def-
inition. Given the lack of characteristic clinical fea-
tures associated with SARS, the definition of cases
had to rely heavily on the contact history of known
patients.
The RT-PCR tests that were in use during April
and May 2003 lacked sensitivity during the first five
days of illness but had better sensitivity in later stag-
es of the illness.
 
12
 
 However, it was demonstrated
that respiratory and fecal specimens are suitable for
diagnosis with the use of RT-PCR. Although speci-
mens from the lower respiratory tract are the most
useful for viral diagnosis, few patients with SARS
have a productive cough early in the course of ill-
ness. Thus, nasopharyngeal aspirates and swabs
and throat and nose swabs are the primary types of
diagnosis
 
* Lymphocytopenia was defined as an absolute lymphocyte count of less than 1500 per cubic millimeter in Singapore and 
as an absolute lymphocyte count of less than 1000 per cubic millimeter in Hong Kong and Canada; thrombocytopenia 
was defined as a platelet count of less than 100,000 per cubic millimeter in China and as a platelet count of less than 
150,000 per cubic millimeter in Hong Kong and Canada; elevated serum levels of alanine aminotransferase and lactate 
dehydrogenase were defined as levels exceeding the upper limit of normal in China and Hong Kong and as levels that 
were more than 1.5 times the upper limit of normal in Canada. SARS denotes severe acute respiratory syndrome, and 
 
NM not mentioned (in the relevant reports).
 
Table 3. Initial Laboratory Abnormalities in Patients with SARS.*
Variable China Hong Kong Canada Singapore All Four Countries
 
number/total number (percent)
 
Anemia NM 17/135 (12.6) NM NM 17/135 (12.6)
Leukopenia 46/190 (24.2) 66/273 (24.2) 2/9  (22.2) NM 114/472 (24.2)
Lymphocytopenia NM 192/273 (70.3) 86/153 (56.2) 18/20 (90.0) 296/446 (66.4)
Thrombocytopenia 25/190 (13.2) 112/273 (41.0) 3/9  (33.3) NM 140/472 (29.7)
Elevated serum alanine 
aminotransferase level
126/190 (66.3) 77/273 (28.2) 5/9  (55.6) NM 208/472 (44.1)
Elevated serum lactate 
dehydrogenase level
50/190 (26.3) 98/138 (71.0) 4/5 (80.0) NM 152/333 (45.6)
 
* SARS denotes severe acute respiratory syndrome, CT computed tomographic, 
and NM not mentioned (in the relevant reports).
† The rate is that for those with initially normal chest radiographs.
 
56
 
‡ Another radiographic study of follow-up CT scans (obtained an average of 36.5 
days after admission) in Hong Kong demonstrated that 23 of 24 patients (96 
percent) had residual ground-glass findings. Fifteen (62 percent) had signs of 
 
fibrosis and peribronchovascular interstitial thickening.
 
57
 
Table 4. Initial Radiographic Manifestations in Patients with SARS.*
Variable China Hong Kong Canada
 
No. of patients studied 28–52 73–138 1–40
Initially abnormal chest radiograph (%) 60.7–100 78.3 60–100
Initially abnormal CT scan (%) 100 53.4† 80–100
Bilateral involvement (%) 17.9–63.4 45.3 41.7–100
Unilateral involvement (%) 34.6–82.1 54.6 50.0–58.3
Lower-zone involvement (%) 67.7 61.1–74.8 70–100
Ground-glass opacifications (%) 31.0–85.7 NM‡ 66.7–100
Consolidation (%) 14.3–65.4 NM 50–100
Both ground-glass opacifications 
and consolidation (%)
NM NM 0–16.7
Pleural effusions (%) NM NM 5
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specimens that have been investigated. Viral RNA
is also detectable in serum or plasma, as well as in
urine. More recently, improved methods of extract-
ing specimens and real-time RT-PCR assays have
improved the sensitivity of testing during the first
few days of illness
 
73
 
 and are now the mainstay for
early diagnosis. When diagnostic tests are evaluat-
ed, it is important that the timing of specimen col-
lection in relation to the onset of disease is defined.
Furthermore, specimens collected during the first
five days of illness should be tested because these
are the specimens that are particularly difficult to
assess for the presence of virus.
In the current context, with a low probability of
a diagnosis of SARS, any positive laboratory result
must be interpreted with caution in view of the pos-
sibility of laboratory error and serious implications
of a positive result for global public health. An ini-
tially positive result on RT-PCR must be confirmed
by testing another clinical sample, reextracting and
testing the original specimen, and using assays that
target different parts of the viral genome (e.g., poly-
merase and nucleocapsid). RT-PCR cannot be used
to rule out infection.
The identification of seroconversion on a whole-
virus immunoassay (an immunofluorescence assay
or an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) remains
the gold standard for the retrospective virologic
confirmation of SARS-CoV infection, but antibody
is detectable only after the first week of illness. The
detection of IgM antibody does not appear to per-
mit earlier diagnosis. Since a few patients with SARS
have had late seroconversion, it is best to test a se-
rum sample collected during the convalescent phase,
at least 21 days and preferably 28 days after the on-
set of symptoms, in order to rule out SARS.
 
11
 
Age and coexisting illness, especially diabetes
mellitus and heart disease, are consistently found
to be independent prognostic factors for the risk
of death and the need for intensive care (Table
5).
 
3,11,46,48,49
 
 In patients older than 65 years of age,
the mortality rate exceeds 50 percent. In some stud-
ies, an increased lactate dehydrogenase level and
an elevated neutrophil count at the time of admis-
sion,
 
3,46
 
 as well as low CD4 and CD8 lymphocyte
counts,
 
74
 
 were associated with a poor prognosis.
SARS in children, especially those younger than 12
years of age, is generally associated with an unevent-
ful course and a good outcome.
 
37,75,76
 
Although a number of strategies have been used
for specific treatment and prevention, controlled
studies documenting the efficacy of therapies are
lacking. Patients with suspected SARS are initially
treated empirically with broad-spectrum antibac-
terial drugs that are effective against other agents
that cause typical and atypical acute community-
acquired pneumonia to exclude these diagnoses.
 
3,5
 
Before the causative agent was known, ribavirin was
used by some as a broad-spectrum empirical anti-
viral agent for the treatment of patients with
SARS.
 
3,11,14,40,77
 
Testing for susceptibility to antiviral drugs sug-
gests that interferon beta, glycyrrhizin (licorice-root
extract), and to a lesser extent, interferon alfa have
activity against SARS-CoV.
 
78,79
 
 In an experimental
macaque model of SARS-CoV infection, treatment
both before exposure and after exposure with peg-
ylated interferon alfa reduced viral replication (un-
published data), and preliminary uncontrolled
studies of combinations of interferon and cortico-
steroids in humans suggest that there are no obvi-
ous adverse effects.
 
1,80
 
 Randomized, placebo-con-
trolled clinical trials appear to be warranted.
There are a number of potential targets for anti-
viral drugs in the replication cycle of SARS-CoV, in-
cluding fusion inhibitors and protease inhibitors.
 
81
 
The availability of the full genome sequence of the
virus provides the basis for targeted strategies to
develop antiviral drugs and vaccines.
 
82
 
The pathogenesis of SARS is still incompletely
understood. Unlike other acute respiratory viral in-
fections, SARS is characterized by a peak in the viral
load in respiratory secretions occurring around the
10th day of illness and a subsequent decrease, con-
comitant with the appearance of an antibody re-
sponse to the virus.
 
11
 
 Some patients have deteriora-
tion during the second week of illness in spite of a
decreasing viral load, and it has been suggested
that part of the damage to the lungs may be immu-
nopathologic in nature.
 
11,67
 
 Some have reported
that early therapy with regimens of high-dose meth-
ylprednisolone is useful in modulating the damage
to the lungs,
 
1,77,83
 
 but no data from randomized,
placebo-controlled trials are available to confirm a
clinical benefit. A number of other therapeutic op-
tions, including thymic peptides or recombinant
human thymus proteins, intravenous immunoglob-
ulin, IgM-enriched immunoglobulin, plasma from
patients in the convalescent phase, and traditional
prognostic factors
management and prevention
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Chinese medicine, have been used, but their clini-
cal efficacy is unclear.
 
1,83-85
 
In the absence of a vaccine, preventing the trans-
mission of SARS involves triage, early case detec-
tion and isolation of patients to prevent transmis-
sion within hospitals, public education, contact
tracing and quarantine of contacts to prevent com-
munity transmission, and surveillance at border
crossings through health-declaration forms and
the monitoring of persons for fever. Nosocomial
spread has been one of the major epidemiologic fea-
tures of SARS outbreaks,
 
3,27,28,40,86
 
 and the elimi-
nation of hospital transmission through enhanced
infection-control practices is an important control
measure. We have not attempted to provide a com-
prehensive review of infection-control measures
for SARS. Precautions against transmission through
respiratory droplets and contact precautions are
critical in preventing the bulk of hospital trans-
mission.
 
71,72,87
 
 In addition, precautions against air-
borne transmission have been recommended and
are clearly needed when aerosol-generating proce-
dures are being undertaken.
 
71,88,89
 
Patients with unrecognized SARS, especially
those with an atypical presentation, the elderly, and
the chronically ill, have been the source of a num-
ber of outbreaks and pose a challenge to infection
control in hospitals.
 
89
 
 Thus, a high index of suspi-
cion is required in the recognition of cryptic cases
of SARS, and infection-control standards must be
reinforced in all parts of the hospital. Given the
stability of SARS-CoV in the environment,
 
33
 
 strict
hand hygiene and training in the use of postexpo-
sure prophylaxis (especially degowning) is particu-
larly critical in preventing the transfer of virus
through fomites and from protective equipment to
the body. Communication about risk through pub-
lic education is vital in order to maintain the correct
balance between public awareness and anxiety, so
that meaningful public health measures can be im-
plemented without causing economic and social
paralysis.
 
* SARS denotes severe acute respiratory syndrome, CI confidence interval, and ICU intensive care unit.
 
† Data from the study by Booth et al.
 
49
 
 are relative risks; all other data are odds ratios.
 
Table 5. Multivariate Analysis of Risk Factors for Adverse Outcomes in Patients with SARS.*
Adverse Outcome Risk Factors
Relative Risk 
or Odds Ratio
(95% CI)† P Value Source
 
Death, ICU admission, or 
mechanical ventilation
Diabetes mellitus 3.1  (1.4–7.2) <0.01 Booth et al.
 
49
 
Other coexisting conditions 2.5  (1.1–5.8) 0.03
Death or ICU admission Advanced age (per 10-yr increment) 1.8  (1.16–2.81) 0.009 Lee et al.
 
3
High peak lactate dehydrogenase level 
(per increment of 100 U/liter)
2.09 (1.28–3.42) 0.003
Neutrophil count above normal limit 
on admission
1.6  (1.03–2.50) 0.04
Development of acute respiratory 
distress syndrome at day 21
Age of 61–80 yr 28.0  (3.1–253.3) 0.003 Peiris et al.11
Positive test for hepatitis B surface 
antigen
18.0  (3.2–101.3) 0.001
Death Age >60 yr 3.5  (1.2–10.2) 0.02 Chan et al.48
Diabetes mellitus or heart disease 9.1  (2.8–29.1) <0.001
Another coexisting condition 5.2  (1.4–19.7) 0.01
Death or ICU care Advanced age (per 10-yr increment) 1.57 (1.26–1.95) <0.001 Tsui et al.46
Neutrophil count on admission 
(per increment of 100 cells/mm3)
1.28 (1.13–1.46) <0.001
Initial lactate dehydrogenase level 
(per increment of 100 U/liter)
1.35 (1.11–1.64) 0.003
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Like many of the other 30 or so new pathogens that
have been recognized in the past three decades,
SARS-CoV may have originated in animals. How-
ever, unlike most of these other pathogens, it has
become efficient at human-to-human transmission,
and this development accounts for the global scale
of the disease. In this respect, SARS-CoV resembles
the human immunodeficiency virus. The SARS out-
break also serves to illustrate the potential health
effects of more transmissible diseases, such as pan-
demic influenza, and highlights the need for pre-
paredness to meet such threats.
It is difficult to make predictions regarding the
resurgence of SARS, but the current information
suggests that the greatest risk of the reemergence
of the disease may derive from an animal reservoir
or infections transmitted in the laboratory.20,32 Ap-
propriate containment measures in diagnostic and
research laboratories must therefore be strength-
ened. Given the fact that SARS-CoV has been iso-
lated from some animals used for food, decisions
about reintroducing such animal species into exotic-
food markets must be based on a proper assessment
of the risks involved. SARS-CoV may also survive be-
tween seasons, owing to unrecognized ongoing dis-
ease transmission in humans in some parts of the
world — for example, asymptomatic carriers or im-
munocompromised patients. However, current
data suggest that these are less likely to be a source
of the reemergence of SARS.
Active surveillance for clusters of cases of se-
vere respiratory disease must be a priority, especial-
ly among health care workers. Such surveillance
should include the rapid diagnosis and prevention
of other respiratory viruses that cause outbreaks of
febrile respiratory disease — notably, influenza.
Surveillance and astuteness on the part of clini-
cians are the keys to the early detection of any re-
emergence before it regains a foothold in the com-
munity.
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